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Abstract 
This paper examines multiple contract design choices in the context of transaction and relational attributes 
and consequent ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs. It focuses on two understudied themes in the IT 
outsourcing literature. First, while the literature is predominantly concerned with opportunism and 
consequent ex-post hazard costs that contracts can safeguard against, parties to a contract also economize 
on ex-ante transaction costs by their choice of contract type and contract extensiveness. Second, the 
literature studies the aggregate extensiveness of contracts rather than of distinct contract functions – 
safeguarding, coordination, and adaptability. Against this backdrop, our research model portrays a 
nuanced picture that is anchored in the following theoretical interpretation: transaction and relational 
attributes have implications on specific ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs, and these implications can 
be balanced by respective choices in both contract type and the extensiveness of specific contract 
functions. These two contract design choices complement and substitute for each other in their ability to 
economize on specific transaction costs. Our analysis of 210 software development outsourcing contracts 
finds that explanatory power increases when analyzing the extensiveness of individual contract functions 
rather than the aggregate contract extensiveness, highlighting subtle competing influences that are 
otherwise masked by an aggregate measure. Our analysis also shows that a preference for Time-and-
Material contracts counteracts the effect of certain transaction attributes on contract extensiveness, and 
even cancels it out in the case of transaction uncertainty.  
Key words: contract functions (safeguarding, coordination, adaptability), contract extensiveness, contract 
type (T&M vs. FP), ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs, transaction cost economics, software 
development outsourcing  
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Contract Design Choices and  
the Balance of Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Transaction Costs  
in Software Development Outsourcing 
INTRODUCTION 
The importance of contract design in IT outsourcing (ITO) is widely recognized. Research has linked the 
structure of ITO contracts to the success of ITO relationships (Fitzgerald and Willcocks 1994; Saunders et 
al. 1997) and has provided empirical guidance on various contract design choices (Anderson and Dekker 
2005; Chen and Bharadwaj 2009; Kalnins and Mayer 2004; Lacity and Willcocks 2000; Lee and Kim 
1999; Susarla et al. 2010). Some studies focus on design choices pertaining to discrete contract features 
such as pricing (Crocker and Reynolds 1993; Kalnins and Mayer 2004), duration (Crocker and Masten 
1988), and decision rights delineation (Susarla 2012). Other studies examine design choices pertaining to 
the extensiveness of contracts, reflected in the number of provisions included in a contract (Anderson and 
Dekker 2005; Chen and Bharadwaj 2009). 
Motivated by two understudied themes in the ITO literature, we focus on factors that affect the 
extensiveness of software development outsourcing (SDO) contracts. One theme is that the parties to a 
contract make choices about its type and extensiveness with the aim of balancing ex-ante transaction 
costs against ex-post transaction costs. Another theme is that outsourcing contracts serve multiple 
functions – safeguarding, coordination, and adaptability (Eckhard and Mellewigt 2006). In the ITO 
literature, only Anderson and Dekker (2005) and Chen and Bharadwaj (2009) address aspects of these 
themes, but subject to limitations we discuss shortly.  
We address the first understudied theme by examining explicitly how the balance between ex-ante and 
ex-post transaction costs interacts with the choice of contract type and contract extensiveness.1 Because 
inter-organizational contracts are inherently incomplete (Williamson 1975), much research has focused on 
                                                     
1Although contract “extensiveness” and “completeness” are related concepts, they are not equally viable as operational measures 
(Eckhard and Mellewigt 2006). Contract extensiveness is a contract design feature that can be assessed just from reading a 
contract, for example, by counting the total number of provisions written in it. In contrast, contract completeness is “the extent to 
which all relevant terms and clauses are specified, and the extent to which the contract accounts for unanticipated contingencies” 
(Ariño and Reuer 2004, p. 7). The operationalization of completeness therefore requires detailed background information on all 
the attributes of a transaction, resulting in a relative measure that is usually not viable. 
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how contract extensiveness is affected by transaction attributes that give rise to ex-post hazard costs of 
opportunism, inefficiencies, and disputes (Ang and Straub 1998; Chen and Bharadwaj 2009; Eckhard and 
Mellewigt 2006; Lacity and Willcocks 1995; Ryall and Sampson 2006). However, while extensive 
contracts can mitigate ex-post hazard costs, their crafting requires ex-ante transaction costs of “planning” 
the exchange and writing the contract (Crocker and Reynolds 1993; Williamson 1981). Research has 
given much less attention to these ex-ante costs. These costs can be significant in high-technology 
contexts (Argyres et al. 2007), and particularly in SDO projects due to a need for extensive knowledge 
transfer, requirements specification, and system design, among other things (Dibbern et al. 2008). Chen 
and Bharadwaj (2009) devote little attention to ex-ante transaction costs in their analysis, whereas 
Anderson and Dekker (2005) seek to explain ex-ante contracting costs by the choice of contract 
extensiveness, rather than the other way around. Ex-ante costs can also influence contract extensiveness 
through the choice of contract type. High ex-ante contracting costs facilitate the use of Time-and-Material 
(T&M) contracts rather than Fixed-Price (FP) contracts because the former need not be as detailed or 
extensive (Gopal et al. 2003; Kalnins and Mayer 2004). Yet, Anderson and Dekker (2005) do not 
consider contract type, and Chen and Bharadwaj (2009) treat it as a control variable on the premise that 
“use of other contractual provisions such as monitoring, dispute resolution, property rights, and 
contingency planning facilitates management of the residual risks not fully covered by the pricing 
structure” (p. 2). We expand on these studies by examining ex-ante cost considerations and by viewing 
the two contract design choices as alternative devices that complement and substitute for one another in 
economizing on transaction costs. Both choices of extensiveness and type aim together at balancing ex-
ante costs against ex-post costs while minimizing overall transaction costs (Crocker and Reynolds 1993). 
To address the second understudied theme, we take this thinking further by examining the extensiveness 
of specific contract functions. According to a comprehensive review of contracting articles in 22 top 
journals, contracts serve three functions: safeguarding partners in line with set expectations, coordinating 
cross-firm activities, and providing for adaptation to changes in the transaction environment (Eckhard 
and Mellewigt 2006). Different research streams focus on a single function at a time. In particular, 
empirical transaction cost economics (TCE) research emphasizes the risk of opportunism and consequent 
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ex-post hazard costs as the problem to be addressed by contracts, leading to a focus on the safeguard 
function of contracts. TCE theory also recognizes the importance of coordination and adaptation in 
contractual relationships (Williamson 1991), but empirical TCE research has seldom studied these 
functions. Select management researchers study individual contract functions, including: factors affecting 
contingency planning and the extensiveness of the contractual adaptability function (Argyres et al. 2007; 
Mayer and Bercovitz 2008), the substitutive and complementary effects of trust on contractual safeguards 
and coordination (Mellewigt et al. 2007), and determinants of provisions having enforcement and 
coordination functions (Reuer and Ariño 2007). In the ITO literature, Anderson and Dekker’s (2005) 
contract dimensions (functions), which emerge from an exploratory factor analysis of their ITO contract 
sample, do not cover the adaptability function, and in Chen and Bharadwaj’s (2009) contract dimensions, 
which emerge from a textual analysis of three ITO contracts in their sample, monitoring provisions are 
only one of the types of coordination provisions used in SDO. In contrast, the pre-defined typology of 
contract functions we use also covers the kinds of coordination and adaptability provisions found in SDO, 
and whose crafting entails higher ex-ante investments in knowledge transfer, specification, and 
contingency planning (Argyres et al. 2007; Dibbern et al. 2008; Mayer and Bercovitz 2008).2 In sum, we 
expand the literature by studying Eckhard and Mellewigt’s (2006) theory-based typology of contract 
functions, while considering ex-ante transaction costs or contract type. 
We perceive these two understudied themes to be related to each other in the sense that a more 
comprehensive understanding of the various roles of different contract functions demands a nuanced 
conceptualization of the balance between ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs. We expect the design 
choices of contract type and contract extensiveness to balance tradeoffs between ex-ante and ex-post 
transaction costs, where the tradeoffs may not equally affect all contract functions. Our research model is 
anchored in the following theoretical interpretation. Transaction and relational attributes – knowledge 
specificity, transaction complexity, transaction uncertainty, and vendor familiarity – have implications on 
                                                     
2 Our discussion of coordination in the context of contract design differs from the IS literature on control (Choudhury and 
Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1997; Rustagi et al. 2008). This literature studies broad modes of control, formal (e.g., behavioral and 
outcome) and informal (e.g., clan and self), also in connection with coordination in software development and its evolution 
during project execution. Our focus on formal contractual controls precludes coverage of informal controls in connection with 
coordination but allows us to study and link explicitly contractual coordination mechanisms with ex-ante transaction costs. 
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specific ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs. These transaction cost implications, along with specific 
characteristics of the software to be developed and the prospective vendor, need to be addressed by 
respective choices in contract type and in the extensiveness of the safeguarding, coordination, and 
adaptability functions. Although the contract type choice normally precedes and can influence contract 
extensiveness, both design choices are mechanisms for controlling transaction costs that complement and 
substitute for each other at the same time (Kalnins and Mayer 2004; Mayer and Bercovitz 2008). Namely, 
both choices are needed to economize on transaction costs, but some transaction costs can be addressed 
by either of the two. Our research model, therefore, portrays a nuanced picture of the interplay between 
transaction and relational attributes, the contract type, and the extensiveness of specific contract functions. 
We explain relationships in the model by carefully looking at how transaction and relational attributes 
influence the balance of ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs, and at how changes in this balance can be 
controlled by contract type and contract extensiveness choices. We therefore advance research on both 
understudied themes in an integrative manner by identifying variations in the balance of ex-ante and ex-
post transaction costs under different contingencies, and by analyzing how these variations are addressed 
by contract type and specific contract functions. By showing that different contract functions are 
differently associated with the balance of ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs, we demonstrate the value 
of considering the extensiveness of specific contract functions.      
We test our research model with a sample of 210 SDO contracts that a large European bank signed with 
multiple vendors. Unlike studies that use mixed samples of ITO contracts,3 focusing on SDO contracts 
sets a suitable context in which economizing on ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs is central. Ex-ante 
costs are significant in SDO projects compared to IT operations because SDO projects are non-recurrent 
and require ex-ante work to specify the services afresh.4 For example, a software development project 
requires an original specification of the target system, while contracting for network operations builds on 
specifications previously developed for earlier network operations outsourcing deals.   
                                                     
3 In particular, in Chen and Bharadwaj’s (2009) sample of 112 ITO contracts, 41% were SDO contracts, and in Anderson and 
Dekker’s (2005) survey-based sample of 858 ITO transactions, only 12% involved software development under the labels 
customized software, branch specific software, and tailor-made software. 
4 Our analysis assumes that different software development contracts are independent of one another in the sense that the 
specifications performed under previous contracts are not used for new contracts. Sometimes, however, a contract is entered into 
to develop a new version of an existing system, in which case available specifications of the existing system may be reused.     
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Table 1 reveals this paper’s contribution to the ITO literature. Whereas much extant research focuses on 
separate elements of the overall contract design problem, our work integrates several of those elements 
and their nuanced interactions. Our research is novel in that we are the first to address the interplay 
between transaction and relational attributes, the balance of ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs, the 
contract type choice, and the choice of extensiveness of specific contract functions in a single study. Two 
tangible benefits follow. First, our work represents an evolution of ITO contracting research: contract type 
is unobserved in Anderson and Dekker (2005), it is used to conduct a split-sample analysis in Chen and 
Bharadwaj (2009), and it is treated in our work as an alternative mechanism to contract extensiveness in 
dealing with transaction costs. Second, by looking at specific contract functions, our work stresses that 
different SDO projects imply the inclusion of different kinds of contract provisions, which studies based 
only on summary measures of contract extensiveness do not make clear. The SDO context, characterized 
by significant ex-ante transaction costs, is highly suitable for making these contract design considerations 
explicit. 
Table 1: Comparison of Extant Research on Contract Extensiveness 
Study 
Transaction Costs Extensiveness of 
Contract Type Ex-ante Ex-post  Contract Contract Functions 
Ang and Straub (1998); 
Lacity and Willcocks (1995); 
etc. 
 Y Y   
Crocker and Reynolds 
(1993) 
Y Y   Y 
Dibbern et al. (2008) Y Y    
Mellewigt et al. (2007)  Y Y   
Argyres et al. (2007)  Y Y Y 
(Adaptability) 
 
Mayer and Bercovitz (2008)  Y Y Y 
(Adaptability) 
 
Reuer and Ariño (2007)  Y Y Y 
(Enforcement and coordination – these 
functions emerged from an exploratory factor 
analysis) 
 
Anderson and Dekker (2005)  









(Rights assignment, after-sales service, 
product and price,* legal recourse – this 
taxonomy emerged from an exploratory factor 
analysis) 
 
Chen and Bharadwaj (2009)  Y Y Y 
 (Monitoring, property rights, dispute 
resolution, contingency – this taxonomy 
emerged from a textual analysis of three 
contracts) 
 
(Treated as a control 
variable; independent of 
contract extensiveness) 
Our study Y Y Y Y 
(Safeguarding, coordination, adaptability – 
this typology is based on a synthesis of 
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the constraints on systems operation and development” (Dibbern et al. 2008, p. 337). Additional ex-ante 
contracting costs are incurred in the contracting stage, in which contract provisions are drafted, 
negotiated, and codified in a legally-enforceable document. Overall, the ex-ante transaction costs can be 
significant for SDO (Dibbern et al. 2008), high-technology transactions (Argyres et al. 2007), and 
complex transactions in general (Crocker and Reynolds 1993). 
Ex-post transaction costs arise during the contract execution (software development) and post-
contractual stages. Some ex-post costs are associated with controlling vendor behavior and performance 
(Das and Teng 1998; Tiwana and Keil 2007)6 through compliance monitoring and coordination activities. 
Contract compliance monitoring costs are needed to ensure conformance with the contract in light of 
concerns about opportunism of the client or the vendor (Dhar and Balakrishnan 2006). They cover costs 
of administering warranties, conducting vendor (client) acceptance testing of deliverables, or dispute 
resolution in case of alleged intellectual property (IP) misappropriation or confidentiality breaches, 
among other things (Chen and Bharadwaj 2009; Gefen et al. 2008). Coordination costs are needed to 
ensure the accomplishment of joint tasks, independent of any concern for opportunism (Dibbern et al. 
2008). They cover costs of linking and integrating client and vendor resources, monitoring vendor 
progress, measuring outcomes (Barzel 1982), and helping to make decisions about functionality when 
development work reveals functionalities that were not fully specified. 
Additional ex-post transaction costs arise when something “goes wrong.” Contract non-compliance costs 
arise when opportunism leads to IP misappropriation, confidentiality breaches, and other costly moral 
hazards (Williamson 1981). Chen and Bharadwaj (2009) include the switching costs associated with the 
contractual relationship turning sour in this subcategory. Non-performance costs arise when opportunism 
or incompetence leads to delays in delivery, functional software defects, performance shortfalls, and 
limited abilities to maintain or upgrade the system (Banker and Kemerer 1992; Dey et al. 2010; Dhar and 
Balakrishnan 2006; Gopal and Koka 2010). Maladaptation costs arise when the contract requires 
                                                     
6 The broad management literature treats “control as any process in which one party affects the behavior of others” (Das and 
Teng 1998, p. 493). More specifically, according to Tiwana and Keil (2007, p. 624), “Control in outsourcing alliances refers to 
the process and rules governing actions by the outsourcee firm in a manner that promotes desirable outsourcee behaviors.” 
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renegotiation in response to changes in the requirements. Some level of requirement volatility is expected 
in all software projects (Tiwana and Keil 2004), demanding adaptations of the specifications, design, and 
coding during development. Dealing with these changes in an outsourced project often requires additional 
knowledge transfer and negotiation.   
Transaction Costs and Contract Design Choices 
Firms seek to minimize transaction costs by making contract design choices – primarily about contract 
pricing and contract extensiveness – that balance ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs. In the following 
subsection, we briefly discuss these choices.  
Choice of Contract Pricing 
Broadly speaking, firms choose between FP and T&M contracts (Baron and Besanko 1987; Kalnins and 
Mayer 2004). FP contracts consist of a lump-sum payment in exchange for the completion of pre-
specified services. They are signed when the parties can agree on a price in advance. This contract type is 
costly to negotiate and draft. It requires both parties to develop ex-ante detailed and complete client 
requirements as a basis for an accurate estimate of contract price. Therefore, it entails higher ex-ante costs 
of knowledge transfer, specification, and contracting. Additional adaptation costs may arise ex-post 
during development, if changes in requirements are necessary. Moreover, under FP contracts, the vendor 
bears the risk of cost escalation, the client has less incentive to incur coordination costs, and the vendor 
has incentives to underprovide quality (Kalnins and Mayer 2004). These adverse consequences give rise 
to the ex-post costs of non-performance (Dey et al. 2010). 
T&M contracts involve the vendor working on a particular task in exchange for a specified payout rate. 
They are signed when it is difficult to estimate contract price accurately, and the client chooses to pay as 
work progresses. The typical assumption is that system specifications are not sufficiently clear and will 
become clearer when partial solutions are presented to users. T&M contracts are less costly to negotiate 
and involve lower ex-ante costs of specification and knowledge transfer because detailed and complete 
requirements are not needed ex-ante. In exchange, there may be higher coordination costs during 
development. Moreover, T&M contracts inherently provide for adaptation. They lower the ex-post costs 
of maladaptation by reducing the need for re-specification and renegotiation during development (Bajari 
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and Tadelis 2001). However, the client bears the risk of cost escalation because the vendor has “an 
incentive to oversupply quality in order to increase costs that can be passed along to the buyer” (Kalnins 
and Mayer 2004, p. 211).  
Hybrid contracts allow for a portion of the contract price to be fixed. They may include FP mechanisms 
such as an FP component with agreed-upon cost estimates or an FP not-to-exceed cap above which any 
cost is absorbed by the vendor (Kalnins and Mayer 2004). Such FP mechanisms require some 
specification work and knowledge transfer, possibly carrying additional ex-ante and ex-post costs 
compared to T&M contracts.  
Contract Functions and Extensiveness 
Contract extensiveness is another contract design choice involving transaction cost tradeoffs (Crocker and 
Reynolds 1993). While extensive contracts protect better against ex-post (hazard) transaction costs, they 
require greater ex-ante investments in transaction planning and in the codification of legally-binding 
provisions (Bajari and Tadelis 2001; Corts and Singh 2004; Dye 1985; Williamson 1985). Anderson and 
Dekker (2005) show that the number of contract terms (contract extensiveness) explains the costs of 
contracting (measured by the number of days spent negotiating and drafting a contract), but only for 
specific contract functions.  
To understand the cost implications of contract extensiveness, it is useful to look at the functions that 
contracts serve. Eckhard and Mellewigt (2006) conducted a comprehensive review of 22 top journals, to 
assess and synthesize empirical evidence on the functions of contracts. They found that inter-firm 
contracts serve the three distinct functions of safeguarding, coordination, and adaptability. Our next 
discussion explicates these functions, and Table 2 lists provisions they cover.  
Safeguarding is a process of bringing about adherence to a desired behavior and outcome, “the purpose 
being to minimize idiosyncratic and deviant behavior” (Mellewigt et al. 2007, p. 834). This is achieved by 
using safeguard provisions that pertain to outcome (e.g., checking software quality against agreed 
specifications) or behavior (e.g., review of coding standards by walking through code with vendor 
personnel) (Eisenhardt 1985; Kirsch 1997; Ouchi 1980). Safeguard provisions (e.g., protection against IP 
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misappropriation, warranties, insurance, after-sale service, and terms of legal recourse in case of disputes) 
typically do not detail the exact nature or traits of the end-product. It is therefore less costly to negotiate 
and draft safeguard provisions than other provision types.  
Coordination is a process of enabling the accomplishment of a collective task (Van de Ven et al. 1976). It 
seeks to minimize inefficiencies and honest mistakes that may occur despite the absence of deviant 
behavior (Das and Teng 1996). Coordination requires linkages and integration of client and vendor 
resources, to facilitate better information flow and to avoid mistakes due to miscommunication (Mayer 
and Argyres 2004). Coordination provisions typically reflect great attention to detail about the nature and 
traits of the end-product (product description, deliverables, quality standards, detailed tasks and 
schedules, milestones, etc.). Their development requires extensive knowledge transfer and specification 
efforts. Therefore, these provisions are more costly to negotiate and codify. 












































Adaptation is a process of adjusting to evolving circumstances. It facilitates ex-post modifications with 
minimal renegotiation when problematic contingencies arise during development (Susarla 2012; 
Williamson 1991). This is achieved through delineation of actions to be taken by the parties in response to 
the materialization of certain contingencies (Mayer and Bercovitz 2008), or to specific changes in 
technology, input prices, government regulations, user requirements, and so on. Adaptability provisions 
can be costly to develop. They may require an extensive planning effort to identify contingencies, devise 
responses, and reach agreements on both (Argyres et al. 2007; Crocker and Reynolds 1993; Mayer and 
Bercovitz 2008). 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
This section develops the conceptual model based on the above discussion and, in turn, formulates several 
research hypotheses.  
Decision Problem and Conceptual Model 
To control transaction costs and balance tradeoffs between ex-ante and ex-post costs, the parties have to 
choose the contract type and the degree of contract extensiveness. These two contract design choices 
complement and substitute for each other in regard to the ability to control transaction costs. They 
complement one another because each facilitates economizing on different ex-ante and ex-post costs; for 
example, T&M contracts cannot neutralize certain ex-post hazard costs that safeguard provisions can 
mitigate (e.g., IP misappropriation). They substitute for each other because they allow economizing on 
some of the same transaction costs; for example, both T&M contracts and contracts with extensive 
adaptability provisions can mitigate ex-post costs of maladaptation. While this means that the two 
contract design choices may influence each other, detangling the exact influence is not trivial and requires 
rich data. However, we can assume that the choice of contract type is usually made earlier. Developing a 
contract could be costly, and so it is less likely that contract type will be chosen after contract 
extensiveness has been determined; for example, it is wasteful to (ex-ante) transfer knowledge and 
negotiate coordination clauses that will not be needed under a T&M contract. This view has empirical 
support in the context of contingency planning (Mayer and Bercovitz 2008): 
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The type of contract is determined early on and then the parties negotiate the specifics, including 
the level of contingency planning. Compustar managers and engineers explained that negotiations 
with a customer begin with the type of contract (fixed fee, time, and materials, etc.), and then 
move on to how much contingency planning to include (p. 155). 
This reasoning leads us to the conceptual model presented earlier in Figure 1. Based on transaction cost 
considerations, the model theorizes that the choice of contract type could suppress or enhance the direct 
influence of transaction and relational attributes on the choice of contract extensiveness.  
The research hypotheses we develop next are anchored in TCE’s focus on transaction cost considerations 
and in complementary theories that enrich our reasoning about the SDO context (Tiwana and Bush 2007). 
TCE identifies several transaction attributes – primarily, asset specificity, transaction complexity, 
transaction uncertainty, and transaction frequency – as important determinants of transaction costs 
(Williamson 1981). Considerable TCE research focuses on how these attributes influence ex-post costs 
due to vendor opportunism (Macher and Richman 2008), thereby emphasizing the safeguarding function 
of contracts. While TCE also recognizes the need for contractual coordination and adaptability in support 
of “planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion” (Williamson 1981, p. 552), it is less explicit 
about these contractual functions and their associated transaction costs (Milgrom and Roberts 1990). 
Agency theory offers a useful complementary perspective. This theory recognizes (like TCE) that the 
vendor (“agent”) might exhibit self-interested shirking behavior, thus, emphasizing two means for 
mitigating such behavior (Tiwana and Bush 2007). One is to pre-specify in detail how project outcomes 
will be evaluated and to tie these to vendor performance and rewards. Another is to monitor the vendor 
during the development process in order to facilitate oversight of vendor activities and outcome quality. 
The theory offers insight into the costs associated with these two means, especially in the face of 
uncertainty over outcomes (Bahli and Rivard 2003; Molinié and Abran 1999). The knowledge-based view 
(KBV) of the firm complements TCE in another way that is relevant to knowledge-intensive, high-
technology contexts. It provides insight into the transaction cost implications of having to exchange and 
integrate client business knowledge with vendor technical knowledge (Dibbern et al. 2008; Grant 1996; 
Tiwana and Bush 2007). These challenges depend on two factors not addressed by TCE: (i) the degree to 
which knowledge about the client’s requirements can be communicated to a vendor and (ii) the stability 
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of such knowledge over the project life. Lastly, relational exchange theory expands on TCE’s treatment 
of transaction frequency. TCE links transaction frequency to scale economies that may incentivize doing 
a transaction internally (Williamson 1985) and to reputation effects on the prospect of winning future 
exchanges (Macher and Richman 2008; Williamson 2002). Relational theory considers other effects of 
repeated exchanges among parties, including trust and relational norms, on contract structure (Heide and 
Miner 1992; Levinthal and Fichman 1988). It views each contract in terms of the history of the 
relationship between parties (Gulati 1995), where exchange hazards are mitigated by both economic and 
sociological mechanisms (Poppo and Zenger 2002).  
As recognized in the literature on contracting, contract type and contract extensiveness are choice 
variables that could be endogenous in our model (Gopal et al. 2003; Hamilton and Nickerson 2003; 
Shaver 1998).  Hence, we examine this possibility in the empirical analysis. 
Hypotheses Development 
Knowledge Specificity 
Asset specificity in SDO is defined as the specificity of knowledge about the client’s business 
requirements, business processes, organizational structure, and IT environment that the vendor needs to 
master in order to perform the task (Beath and Walker 1998; Chen and Bharadwaj 2009; Dibbern et al. 
2005, 2008). 
Knowledge specificity creates an asymmetry of knowledge between the client and vendor, thus, 
influencing both ex-ante and ex-post costs. In the TCE view, knowledge proprietary to the client typically 
needs to be shared and integrated into the software development process, or else the client will encounter 
difficulties in formulating objectives and requirements for the vendor (Tiwana and Bush 2007). The client 
can address the knowledge asymmetry by transferring to the vendor sufficient domain knowledge for the 
vendor to lead the requirements specification (Choudhury and Sampler 1997; Dibbern et al. 2008), or by 
“substituting” for the vendor and completing the requirements specification internally and handing them 
to the vendor for execution (Mirani 2007). Both approaches carry ex-ante costs. However, the KBV 
suggests that neither of these approaches may be sufficient for ex-ante specification and, therefore, 
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additional ex-post coordination would be necessary. The reason is that client-specific knowledge “can be 
highly tacit, ‘sticky,’ and deeply embedded in the idiosyncratic internal practices of the client firm” 
(Tiwana and Bush 2007, p. 271). Tacit knowledge is difficult to externalize (Conner and Prahalad 1996), 
suggesting that knowledge substitution is not likely to be efficient. The transfer of tacit knowledge is no 
less challenging (Dibbern et al. 2008) since it requires active participation of client personnel in educating 
vendor personnel (Nonaka 1994). The client, however, often lacks personnel to provide this level of 
participation. In this light, knowledge specificity is expected to make inputs (e.g., requirements) and 
outputs (e.g., software quality targets) uncertain (Nidumolu 1995), demanding the client to expand more 
effort on monitoring and coordination activities to ensure adequate product functionality and quality 
(Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003). The vendor, too, has an incentive to increase coordination to ensure 
that the client provides necessary knowledge in a timely manner (Kautz 2009). Overall, this implies high 
ex-post costs for monitoring and coordination. 
TCE also suggests that the vendor’s propensity to behave opportunistically increases when it has to invest 
in client-specific knowledge. Client-specific investments prevent the vendor from realizing scale 
economies by employing the same personnel in engagements with other clients. Therefore, the vendor 
may underinvest in acquiring client-specific knowledge or relocate personnel familiar with the client to 
other accounts in mid-project. This could lead to ex-post costs of non-performance due to delays or 
inferior product quality. Opportunistic behavior could also mean recovering client-specific investments by 
engaging in rent seeking via exploitation of bilateral lock-in conditions (Susarla 2012), misappropriation 
of IP, and confidentiality breaches. Such rent-seeking tactics lead to ex-post costs of non-compliance. 
The higher ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs associated with knowledge specificity can be controlled 
by expanding the contract functions of safeguarding and coordination. Provisions that safeguard against 
misappropriation of relationship-specific resources and define sanctions for non-compliance can mitigate 
ex-post contract non-compliance costs. Coordination provisions help the client to contain the expectedly 
higher costs of monitoring and coordination activities, by formally defining how the client will become 
involved in software development processes (e.g., communication plan and meeting frequency) and how 
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vendor progress is to be tracked (e.g., milestones). Coordination provisions also enable the client to 
mitigate non-performance costs. Importantly, though, coordination provisions should be less costly to 
codify under high knowledge specificity. The TCE reasoning about the tradeoff between ex-ante 
specification and ex-post coordination holds in the SDO context: increased ex-ante knowledge transfer 
results in more complete specification documents (product description, deliverables, project tasks, etc.) 
that make coordination provisions richer and easier to formulate. In this light, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, knowledge specificity is positively associated with the 
extensiveness of the safeguarding and coordination functions. 
Transaction Complexity 
Transaction complexity is reflected in the degree to which the software product being developed includes 
multiple modules, data sources, and interfaces with other systems (Novak and Eppinger 2001).  
More complex software generally requires higher ex-ante costs of knowledge transfer and specification. If 
the system to be built has interactions with other client systems, the parties need to communicate 
knowledge about the new system and about the business and technical environment of those client 
systems. The transfer of these two separate knowledge sets demands more effort according to the KBV 
(Nickerson and Zenger 2004). More importantly, because the number of interactions among modules, 
data sources, and interfaces to other systems grows exponentially with the number of elements, 
complexity increases the ex-ante cost of requirements specification.   
Transaction complexity also increases the ex-post hazard costs. A greater need to communicate 
knowledge about existing client systems and the new system makes software design less independent. 
According to the KBV, this need introduces knowledge exchange hazards and leads to more integrated 
governance modes (Nickerson and Zenger 2004) that require increased coordination. More complex 
software also leaves the vendor more room to compromise on quality, leading to higher ex-post costs of 
non-performance due to technical defects, performance shortfalls, delays in delivery, and lower 
maintainability and upgradability (Banker and Kemerer 1992; Gefen et al. 2008). The client is, again, 
required to invest more in monitoring and coordination activities in order to assist and ensure that the 
vendor accomplishes the collective task satisfactorily (Van de Ven et al. 1976).  
18 
 
Transaction complexity is not likely to increase ex-post adaptation costs, however. Complexity gives rise 
to a broader spectrum of contingencies. It makes it more difficult and costly to conduct contingency 
planning and to ex-ante codify respective provisions (Argyres and Mayer 2007; Susarla et al. 2010). 
Identifying feasible contingencies and negotiating mutually acceptable responses is more difficult when 
the possibilities are more numerous (Crocker and Reynolds 1993). The parties can compensate for this 
challenge, in part, by investing more heavily in ex-ante specification and ex-post coordination. 
Facing higher transaction complexity, the client is expected to deal with the higher ex-post costs by 
expanding the safeguarding and coordination contract functions. Safeguard provisions mitigate ex-post 
costs of non-performance; for example, warranties, customer acceptance testing, and after-sale service 
specification (Anderson and Dekker 2005; Chen and Bharadwaj 2009). Coordination provisions contain 
the higher ex-post costs of monitoring and coordination activities. As noted earlier, these costs might 
escalate in the absence of such provisions. Again, coordination provisions should be less costly to 
formulate under high transaction complexity since an increased effort of ex-ante knowledge transfer and 
specification results in more complete specification documents. In contrast, we expect the adaptability 
contract function to be less extensive since increased software complexity makes adaptability provisions 
more costly to develop and specify. All of this leads to our next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, transaction complexity is positively associated with the 
extensiveness of the safeguarding and coordination functions, and negatively associated 
with the extensiveness of the adaptability function. 
Relatively high ex-ante transaction costs of knowledge transfer and specification and ex-post costs of 
coordination may motivate the parties to opt for a T&M contract. Presumably, they may decide to control 
the higher ex-ante and ex-post costs of expanding certain contract functions through contract type as a 
substitutive mechanism. Indeed, the extant literature suggests that transaction complexity is positively 
associated with the use of T&M contracts (Bajari and Tadelis 2001). When a software system is complex, 
the exact development effort and time are difficult to estimate in advance even if requirements are fully 
specified, making an FP contract a less viable alternative (Banerjee and Duflo 2000; Kalnins and Mayer 
2004). Moreover, use of T&M contracts generally lowers ex-ante costs: knowledge transfer is more 
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targeted and occurs where needed during development,7 much less ex-ante specification is needed, and 
contracting demands less planning, negotiating, and drafting. At the same time, T&M contracts do not 
necessarily increase ex-post transaction costs. Maladaptation costs are inherently lower with T&M 
contracts, as unforeseen contingencies can be accommodated during development (Bajari and Tadelis 
2001). Also lower are the ex-post costs of non-performance due to defects, quality shortfalls, and delays. 
T&M contracts “create an incentive to oversupply quality in order to … increase revenue for the project” 
(Kalnins and Mayer 2004, p. 211). By contrast, the ex-post costs of coordination are generally higher with 
such contracts than with FP contracts, as ex-ante interaction between client and vendor is traded for ex-
post interaction between them. In sum, T&M contracts lower some ex-post costs and increase others.  
While choosing a T&M contract in the face of high transaction complexity increases some ex-post costs 
while lowering some ex-ante costs, it has little bearing on the association between transaction complexity 
and the extensiveness of contract functions. The safeguarding function is still necessary (e.g., penalties for 
IP misappropriation and confidentiality breaches) because T&M contracts do not mitigate all ex-post 
costs of non-compliance. Coordination provisions are needed to contain the high ex-post costs of 
coordination that these contracts demand during development (e.g., meeting frequency and 
communication plans). Finally, the adaptability function would be even less extensive since T&M 
contracts lower the ex-post costs of maladaptation. In sum, taking into account the use of T&M contracts 
as a mechanism for controlling transaction costs, we do not expect a change in the associations specified 
in Hypothesis 2.  
Transaction Uncertainty 
Transaction uncertainty refers to the degree to which sources of potential disturbances undermine the 
ability to foresee possible changes (Klein et al. 1990). In SDO and ITO, uncertainty is attributed with a 
“difficulty of defining ex ante and verifying ex post the products and services for which the parties are 
contracting” (Anderson and Dekker 2005, p. 1739). Whereas complexity is a product of having too many 
                                                     
7 In regard to knowledge transfer, FP contracts need to address a larger variety of circumstances that may or may not happen 
during actual development; in T&M contracts, conversely, it is natural to acquire less knowledge in the first phases of 
development and to address specific knowledge needs when they arise.  
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contingencies whose probabilities are difficult to assign, uncertainty is created by an inherent lack of 
knowledge of the contingencies and their probabilities (Slater and Spencer 2000). 
Transaction uncertainty per se does not increase the ex-ante costs of knowledge transfer and specification 
or the ex-post costs of non-compliance, but it does increase the ex-post costs of non-performance and 
maladaptation. According to agency theory, uncertainty due to lack of clarity on task requirements and 
outcome measurement makes it “difficult to write contracts that adequately govern an outsourcing 
relationship” (Tiwana and Bush 2007, p. 269). Transaction uncertainty is also associated with the 
instability of software requirements (Gopal et al. 2003). The KBV suggests that requirements volatility 
lowers the reliability of knowledge transfer about the project scope and increases the risk that the 
delivered system might not meet the client’s evolved needs (Tiwana and Bush 2007). These two issues 
lead to ex-post costs of performance shortfalls and schedule slippage. Furthermore, uncertainty 
significantly increases the need for ex-post adaptation (Bajari and Tadelis 2001). Unlike with transaction 
complexity, however, high ex-post costs of maladaptation cannot be mitigated by investing more in ex-
ante transaction planning and specification. 
Higher ex-post costs due to transaction uncertainty can be addressed using appropriate contract 
provisions. Certain safeguard provisions can mitigate ex-post non-performance costs (e.g., warranties), 
but not when transaction uncertainty makes requirements unclear and difficult to verify ex-post. Agency 
theory predicts that uncertainty leads to more intensive coordination (Tiwana and Bush 2007), as 
evidenced in the software development context (Dey et al. 2010; Lichtenstein 2004). Coordination 
provisions more effectively lower ex-post cost of non-performance by allowing the client to engage the 
vendor, be involved in the development process, and keep closer tabs on what is going on (Gefen et al. 
2008). Thus, more extensive contractual coordination is expected, at some extra ex-ante cost of 
specification and ex-post cost of coordination activities. Likewise, more extensive contractual adaptability 
lowers the maladaptation costs, at some extra ex-ante cost of identifying contingencies and codifying 
response plans. In sum, while transaction uncertainty is reported to have a limited or even no impact on 
aggregate contract extensiveness (Anderson and Dekker 2005; Dibbern et al. 2004; Rindfleisch and 
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Heide 1997), we expect it to have a positive effect on the extensiveness of the coordination and 
adaptability contract functions. 
Hypothesis 3a: Ceteris paribus, transaction uncertainty is positively associated with the 
extensiveness of the coordination and adaptability functions. 
Opting for a T&M contract is an alternative way to deal with high transaction uncertainty, as suggested by 
extant studies (Dey et al. 2010; Gopal et al. 2003). T&M contracts can control the ex-post costs of non-
performance and maladaptation, while avoiding the ex-ante costs of developing more extensive 
contractual coordination and adaptability provisions. As discussed earlier, under T&M contracts, the 
interaction between client and vendor before the contract is signed (e.g., for ex-ante specification) is 
traded for significant interaction during development, as described by Gefen et al. (2008): 
It is in the nature of TM projects that the client engages the vendor much more, is more involved 
with the software development process, and can keep closer tabs on what is going on than in FP 
projects. In addition, TM projects are often onsite, making it easier to evaluate the software 
during development, rather than as a black box during testing as in FP projects (p. 9).  
T&M contracts also lower the ex-post costs of maladaptation without requiring the high ex-ante costs of 
contingency planning. Unlike FP contracts, T&M contracts facilitate adaptation during development 
(Gopal et al. 2003). The client will be able to persuade the vendor to accommodate changes without 
having to renegotiate the contract (Kalnins and Mayer 2004). In this light, we provide an additional 
hypothesis about the influence of T&M contracts on the relationship between transaction uncertainty and 
contract extensiveness:  
Hypothesis 3b: Use of T&M contracts reduces the association between transaction 
uncertainty and the extensiveness of the coordination and adaptability functions. 
Vendor Familiarity 
Vendor familiarity is a product of repeated exchanges with a vendor. While TCE originally linked 
transaction frequency to the benefits of scale economies, many scholars observed that the governance of 
repeated inter-firm exchanges is also embedded in social relationships, giving rise to relational exchange 
theory:  
Economists emphasize the rational, calculative origins of relational governance, emphasizing 
particularly expectations of future exchanges that prompt cooperation in the present. Sociologists 
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emphasize socially derived norms and social ties that have emerged from prior exchange (Poppo 
and Zenger 2002, p. 710). 
According to relational exchange theory, repeated exchanges between a specific client–vendor dyad may 
have important implications on contract design choices (Gefen et al. 2008; Mayer and Argyres 2004). 
Familiarity with a vendor has two benefits (Gefen et al. 2008; Gulati 1995). More familiar vendors have 
already acquired knowledge about the client’s business and technological environment through the 
development of systems previously contracted by the client. This lowers the ex-ante costs of knowledge 
transfer. Familiar vendors are also more trusted (Dyer and Singh 1998) and, therefore, less prone to 
opportunistic behavior (Gefen et al. 2008; Mayer 2006; Noorderhaven1996; Ouchi 1980; Poppo and 
Zenger 2002). This means less ex-post cost of non-compliance. Moreover, the “promise of future business 
is greater with repeat customers, so the supplier has every incentive to be honest and flexible” (Kalnins 
and Mayer 2004, p. 212). Thus, the vendor will also accommodate client requests for adaptation without 
much renegotiation, implying lower ex-post costs of maladaptation. In sum, the client is faced with lower 
ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs as a consequence of vendor familiarity, suggesting that some 
contract functions will be less extensive. This explains why research “has generally viewed relational 
governance and formal contracts as substitutes” (Poppo and Zenger 2002, p. 711). 
However, it is useful to bring to bear the “learning to contract” perspective (Mayer and Argyres 2004), 
which suggests that relational governance and formal contracts can also be complementary (Poppo and 
Zenger 2002). Familiarity of the parties helps them to learn about issues that might arise due to a variety 
of problems and about effective strategies for handling them (Poppo and Zenger 2002; Ryall and 
Sampson 2006). Research shows this learning to lead to improved client–vendor communication 
(Williamson 1979), to utilization of more safeguards for preventing repeated disputes (Mayer and Argyres 
2004), to more precisely codified safeguards (Argyres et al. 2007; Mayer and Argyres 2004; Ryall and 
Sampson 2006), and to reuse of provisions that were agreed upon in the past (Mayer and Bercovitz 2008; 




All in all, vendor familiarity has a trust effect and a learning effect with opposing impacts on contract 
extensiveness, and “the optimal level of contract detail depends upon the relative magnitude of these two 
effects” (Ryall and Sampson 2006, pp. 209). By this logic, since safeguard provisions display more 
standardization across SDO situations, the learning effect would make them less costly to specify and, 
therefore, would dominate the trust effect. Hence, vendor familiarity would not lower the extensiveness of 
safeguard provisions, as has been observed for penalties (Ryall and Sampson 2006) and dispute resolution 
provisions (Chen and Bharadwaj 2009). In contrast, since coordination and adaptability provisions in 
SDO tend to be project-specific, they would be costly to draft in spite of the learning effect and, therefore, 
the trust effect would dominate. Hence, vendor familiarity would reduce the extensiveness of the 
coordination and adaptability functions, as also reported by Reuer and Ariño (2007) and by Mayer and 
Argyres (2004), respectively. 
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, vendor familiarity is negatively associated with the 
extensiveness of the coordination and adaptability functions. 
The literature shows that vendor familiarity is associated with the use of T&M contracts (Gefen et al. 
2008; Gopal et al. 2003). Presumably, because of increased trust, the client responds to the low ex-post 
costs of vendor opportunism and lower risk of cost escalation by opting for a T&M contract. In addition, 
choosing a T&M contract does not increase the ex-ante costs of specification and contracting nor the ex-
post costs of coordination and maladaptation. To the contrary, it lowers the ex-post costs of non-
performance and maladaptation because the client is incentivized to be more involved in development 
(Gefen et al. 2008) and the vendor is incentivized to overinvest in quality and avoid opportunities to 
renegotiate the initial contract (Kalnins and Mayer 2004). Accordingly, taking into account the influence 
of T&M contracts on ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs, we did not expect a change in the associations 
between vendor familiarity and the extensiveness of the coordination and adaptability functions.   
DATA AND ANALYSIS 
We next discuss the data and methodology used to test our research hypotheses, and then present the 




Data were collected from the archival contract repository of the IT department in a leading international 
bank headquartered in Europe. The bank’s IT department is part of its headquarters and employs about 
3,000 permanent employees and 2,000 contractors. It uses five different contractual arrangements to 
acquire IT resources: body (personnel) leasing, consulting, system maintenance, software licensing, and 
software development. This last type is the focus of our study.  
The data sample included 210 SDO contracts the bank signed between January 2000 and December 2003. 
The data specify the fixed price component relative to the estimated total project price, based on which 
the non-fixed-to-total price ratio can be calculated; we term this as the T&M-ratio. Of the 210 contracts, 
128 were FP with a T&M-ratio of 0.0, 52 were T&M with a T&M-ratio of 1.0, and 30 were hybrid 
contracts with a T&M-ratio that ranges between 0.0 and 1.0. The overall average T&M-ratio was 0.272. 
The contracts in the sample had a total value of $70.1 million. Their values ranged from $5,167 to $3.49 
million, with an average of $337,079, and their durations ranged from 15 to 880 days, with an average of 
192 days. The contracts were signed with 54 different vendors.  
Contract Extensiveness: The data items extracted from the contracts were objective legally-binding 
provisions. We used the classification of contract functions presented in Table 2 as the conceptual basis 
for operationally mapping provisions in our contract samples in the functions of safeguarding, 
coordination, and adaptability. In what follows, we established the validity for our measures by listing the 
provisions in each category and making references to other studies that used the same or similar 
provisions. Following Parkhe (1993) and Reuer and Ariño (2007), we measured the extensiveness of 
contract functions as a simple count of the number of provisions in each function.  
The extensiveness of the safeguarding function was measured as a count of contractual safeguard 
provisions, where each was a binary item coded as 1. These provisions mapped to safeguards against 
vendor opportunism described in Table 2, corresponding to what others call rights assignment (Anderson 
and Dekker 2005; Chen and Bharadwaj 2009), penalties (Reuer and Ariño 2007; Ryall and Sampson 
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2009), after-sale service specification (Anderson and Dekker 2005), and enforcement (Reuer and Ariño 
2007) (Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was 0.75):  
• Source Code Escrow account/IP protection. If the contract designates an escrow party that holds the 
source code and transfers it to the client if the vendor closes down 
• Penalty. If the contract specifies a vendor penalty amount to be paid in the event of a breach of 
confidentiality, data protection, or employment of bank staff 
• Warranty. If the contract specifies a warranty period post project completion 
• Customer acceptance test (CAT). If the contract specifies that CAT is to be completed by a pre-
specified time  
The extensiveness of the coordination function was measured as a count of contractual coordination 
clauses, where each was a binary item coded as 1. These clauses corresponded to at least one of the 
coordination activities described in Table 2, representing monitoring mechanisms (Ryall and Sampson 
2009; Susarla 2012), specification of milestones and deliverables (Lichtenstein 2004; Sommerville 2004), 
payment terms (Anderson and Dekker 2005), and communication-related activities (Mellewigt et al. 
2007; Susarla 2012; Willcocks and Feeny 2006) (Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was 0.71):  
• Project milestones. If the project schedule identifies activity endpoints that entail customer sign-off 
on such things as specification papers and internal testing  
• Intermediate deliverables. If the project schedule defines points when the vendor submits 
intermediate deliverables, such as system modules, that should be checked and accepted by the client; 
these are not tied to payments.  
• Intermediate payments. If the project schedule defines intermediate payments to the vendor; these are 
not tied to intermediate deliverables.  
• Intermediate deliverables/payments. If the project schedule defines points when the vendor submits 




• Meetings. If the contract mandates meetings at some frequency (e.g., bi-weekly or monthly); meetings 
ease the challenges of communication between client and vendor. 
The extensiveness of the adaptability function is measured as a single binary-item variable, consistent 
with the operational definition of Argyres et al. (2007): 
• Contingent change provision. If the contract includes an adaptability clause, which allows the client to 
initiate requests for changes in requirements, to which the vendor can agree and respond with respective 
price and schedule adjustments 
Finally, aggregate contract extensiveness is measured as the sum of provision counts of safeguarding, 
coordination, and adaptability. 
Contract Type: The variable T&M-ratio takes a value between 0 and 1, indicating the portion of the 
overall project cost that is not fixed in the contract (i.e., one minus the fixed-to-total-price ratio). 
Transaction Attributes: The conceptual definitions brought forward in hypotheses development are used 
to operationally define transaction attributes. Consistent with extant definitions of client specificity of 
knowledge requirements (Dibbern et al. 2005, 2008; Rustagi et al. 2008), knowledge specificity is 
measured as a binary variable, coded as 0 if the contract referenced only the target software product and 
as 1 if it also referenced explicitly the product’s work environment (business processes, specific user 
types, etc.) and related systems. In accordance with the definition offered earlier in hypotheses 
development (Anderson and Dekker 2005), transaction complexity was measured as a binary variable, 
coded as 0 if the contract referenced the target software product as a single-module system and as 1 if the 
product was referenced as a multi-module system with multiple data sources and interfaces to other 
modules. Consistent with Anderson and Dekker (2005), transaction uncertainty was measured as a binary 
variable on the basis of two binary items: it is coded as 0 if the contract contained no explicit statement of 
(i) business objectives and (ii) technical outcomes, and as 1 otherwise. A contract lacking these items is 
taken to indicate a difficulty defining ex-ante and verifying ex-post the contracted product. 
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Relational Attributes: Vendor familiarity was measured based on the number and cumulative price of 
SDO contracts signed with the vendor of a contract (Gefen et al. 2008). This operational definition relies 
on accepted perceptions of inter-organizational trust as originating from both prior history and 
expectations of continuity (Poppo et al. 2008). Accordingly, vendor familiarity was measured by the next 
four items, the first two reflecting past experience and the last two reflecting expectations of future 
transactions: 
• Past contracts with vendor. Number of past contracts with a vendor up to the current contract 
• Past cost with vendor. Total cost of past contracts with a vendor up to the current contract (K US$) 
• Total contracts with vendor. Number of all contracts signed with a vendor in the sampling period 
• Total cost with vendor. Total cost of all contracts signed with a vendor in the sampling period (K US$) 
Project size, which we later used as an instrumental variable, was measured based on two items: project 
price, measured in US dollars, and project duration, measured in days from the start date to the expected 
delivery date (Ethiraj et al. 2005; Gopal et al. 2003).   
The scores for transaction uncertainty, vendor familiarity, and project size were computed on the basis of 
a principal component analysis (PCA) with a Varimax rotation. The results strongly support our 
operational definitions of the three factors, with factor loadings above 0.7 and cross-loadings below 0.2, 
indicating satisfactory convergent and discriminant validity. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were 0.69 for 
transaction uncertainty, 0.95 for vendor familiarity, and 0.71 for project size, indicating satisfactory 
reliability. Factor scores were subsequently computed as the means of normalized item values weighted 
by loadings.  
Table 3 displays descriptive statistics for the above items. Although the multi-item factors were measured 
by objective, legally-binding contractual items, we followed the norm of reporting their reliability in 
Table 4 (Mithas et al. 2011). Their Cronbach’s alphas were close to or exceeded the recommended 0.7 
level, indicating their internal consistency reliability. Finally, Table 5 displays inter-correlations for the 
integrative measures used for hypothesis testing. We used the log values of the integrative measures of 
vendor familiarity and project size because of their skewed distribution. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Contract Items 
Data Item  N  Mean  Std Dev Min  Max 
Source code escrow account/IP protection (present Y/N) 210 0.110 0.313 0  1 
Penalty (present Y/N)  210 0.633 0.483 0  1 
Warranty (present Y/N)  210 0.762 0.427 0  1 
Customer acceptance test (CAT) (present Y/N) 210 0.752 0.433 0  1 
Project milestones (present Y/N)  210 0.671 0.471 0  1 
Intermediate deliverables (present Y/N) 210 0.571 0.496 0  1 
Intermediate payments (present Y/N) 210 0.600 0.491 0  1 
Intermediate deliverables/payments (present Y/N) 210 0.481 0.501 0  1 
Meetings (present Y/N)  210 0.271 0.446 0  1 
Contingency change (present Y/N) 210 0.110 0.313 0  1 
T&M‐ratio  210 0.272 0.424 0  1 
Knowledge specificity  210 0.561 0.249 0  1 
Transaction complexity  210 0.857 0.351 0  1 
Business objectives  210 0.314 0.465 0  1 
Technical outcomes  210 0.867 0.341 0  1 
Past contracts with vendor  210 19.35 24.86 0  96 
Total contracts with vendor  210 37.94 36.67 1  97 
Past cost with vendor ($K)  210 4,680 5,796 0  21,037 
Total cost with vendor ($K)  210 8,644 7,994 38.33  21,052 
Project price ($K)  210 337 493 5.167  3,489 
Project duration (days)  210 192 143 15  880 
 
 























(3) Adaptability Extensiveness  Contingency change NA NA NA 
(4) T&M‐ratio  T&M‐ratio NA NA NA 
(5) Knowledge Specificity  Knowledge specificity NA NA NA 

















Table 5: Factor Inter-Correlations  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8  9 
   (0)   Aggregate Extensiveness       
   (1)   Safeguarding Extensiveness  0.739    
   (2)   Coordination Extensiveness  0.848 0.289    
   (3)   Adaptability Extensiveness  ‐0.248 ‐0.619 ‐0.005    
   (4)   T&M‐ratio  ‐0.566 ‐0.230 ‐0.618 ‐0.054    
   (5)   Knowledge Specificity  ‐0.110 ‐0.171 ‐0.025 0.108 ‐0.144    
   (6)   Transaction Complexity  0.224 0.307 0.098 ‐0.249 0.098 ‐0.390    
   (7)   Transaction Uncertainty  0.145 ‐0.029 0.205 0.184 ‐0.335 0.221 ‐0.302    
   (8)   Vendor Familiarity  ‐0.133 ‐0.004 ‐0.121 ‐0.327 0.081 ‐0.127 0.220 ‐0.165   
   (9)   Project Size  ‐0.367 ‐0.090 ‐0.437 ‐0.122 0.815 ‐0.218 0.206 ‐0.225  0.264 
Values in boldface indicate Pearson correlations statistically significant at a 5% level or lower. 
 
Method of Analysis 
We used regression methods to test our research hypotheses. While our hypotheses did not address the 
variable of aggregate contract extensiveness, we examined it to demonstrate our contribution of studying 
specific contract functions. Assuming a linear specification, our analysis involved the following 
equations: 
&                                                                      1  
         2  
                                                                         3  
           4  
                                             5  
We started with the effect of transaction and relational attributes on contract type (T&M-ratio) and on 
aggregate contract extensiveness. We used ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to estimate equation 
(1) (Model 0) and equation (2) without T&M-ratio (Model 1). We ran seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SUR) on the system of equations (3)–(5) without T&M-ratio to estimate the effects of transaction and 
relational attributes on specific contract functions (Model 1 – functions). SUR was necessary because 
interdependencies among contract functions could render error terms correlated and viable due to the fact 
that each function is influenced by a different set of explanatory variables. 
Then, to address the effect of the contract type choice, we added the T&M-ratio as an explanatory 
variable, while recognizing the possibility that endogeneity may cause our estimates to be biased and 
inconsistent. Specifically, this part of the analysis was complicated by the possibility of endogeneity due 
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to T&M-ratio being both predicted by transaction and relational attributes, and as a predictor of contract 
extensiveness (Figure 1). It is also possible that the contracting parties anticipated hazards and made self-
selection adjustments in contract type. In particular, research has shown that firms self-select contracts 
into the T&M category on the basis of the expected contracting effort and contract extensiveness (Kalnins 
and Mayer 2004; Mayer and Bercovitz 2008). We did not consider transaction and relational attributes to 
be endogenous because they are not likely to be adjusted (self-selected) based on expectations about 
contract extensiveness. That is, they are not likely to be guided by the need for inclusion of specific 
provisions at the time of contract negotiation. Knowledge specificity and complexity of the software to be 
developed follow from business and technological needs of the client, and the levels of environmental 
uncertainty and vendor familiarity (past experience) are given when a specific contract is negotiated and 
drafted.   
We primarily controlled for endogeneity by using two-stage least squares (2SLS) (Antonakis et al. 2014; 
Bascle 2008), where T&M-ratio is instrumented by project size. Project size is informative on the basis of 
previous research that has found it to positively impact the likelihood of using T&M contracts (Fink and 
Lichtenstein 2014; Gopal et al. 2003). This supposition was confirmed by the high correlation between 
the two variables in our data (Table 5). At the same time, project size was exogenous. Project scope 
decisions are driven by business and technological needs of the client rather than the need to include 
specific contract provisions. We followed the next steps to develop the 2SLS estimator. First, we 
developed an OLS estimator of contract type (T&M-ratio) using transaction and relational attributes 
[equation (1)] and saved the residuals. Second, we added the residuals and T&M-ratio as independent 
variables to equations (2)–(5). Third, we developed non-instrumented estimators by using the OLS 
method with equation (2) and the SUR method with equations (3)–(5). The coefficients of the residuals 
came out significant for aggregate contract extensiveness in equation (2) and coordination extensiveness 
in equation (4). This suggests that the endogenous variable, T&M-ratio, should be instrumented. 
Therefore, we developed a 2SLS instrumented estimator for aggregate contract extensiveness (Model 2) 
and three-stage least squares (3SLS) instrumented estimators for the three contract functions (Model 2–
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functions). We also ran the Hausman specification test for endogeneity (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993; 
Hausman 1978). This test compares the coefficients of the instrumented 2SLS estimator and the non-
instrumented OLS estimator, where a significant difference indicates that the OLS estimator is 
inconsistent. The Hausman test was statistically significant for aggregate contract extensiveness in 
equations (2) (χ2 = 9.29, p = 0.0023), and for coordination extensiveness in equation (4) (χ2 = 4.62, p = 
0.0316); it was non-significant for equations (3) and (5), as well as for equations (3)–(5) analyzed as a 
system of equations. The Hausman test supports the use of the instrumented models. In all cases, we also 
tested for the presence of multicollinearity (Belsley et al. 1980), outliers, and the normality of errors 
(Shapiro and Wilks 1965) and found no violated assumptions of the OLS model. 
We also used Heckman’s adjustment to control for selection bias (Chen and Bharadwaj 2009; Gopal et al. 
2003; Hamilton and Nickerson 2003; Heckman 1979), knowing that firms self-select contracts into the 
T&M category on the basis of the expected need for contract extensiveness (Kalnins and Mayer 2004; 
Mayer and Bercovitz 2008). We specifically used the treatment effect model described in Shaver (1998). 
In the first step, a probit regression was used to analyze the probability of a “positive” value of a single 
dependent variable possessing a limited range (e.g., binary or ordered). In our case, contract type was the 
target dependent variable, and it took on a value of 1 when the contract choice was pure T&M. This step 
computed a bias correction factor called the inverse Mills ratio. In the second step, the inverse Mills ratio 
was introduced as an additional explanatory variable into equation (2) for aggregate extensiveness and 
into equations (3)–(5) for the extensiveness of contract functions. In our case, the inverse Mills ratio was 
statistically significant, indicating the need to adjust for endogeneity. 
Analysis Results 
The analysis results, summarized in Tables 6 and 7, generally support our research hypotheses. Model 0 
in Table 6 confirms that transaction complexity, transaction uncertainty, and vendor familiarity are 
positively associated with T&M-ratio. Model 1 shows that the same three attributes are significantly 
associated with aggregate contract extensiveness, but with a negative coefficient for vendor familiarity. 
Model 2 shows that these same associations remain statistically significant after the inclusion of T&M-
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ratio (instrumented by project size) and that T&M-ratio is negatively associated with aggregate contract 
extensiveness, consistent with our argument about substitution in contract design decisions. The inclusion 
of the inverse Mills ratio following Heckman’s adjustment yields similar results (not reported here), 
except for a small difference. The association between vendor familiarity and aggregate extensiveness is 
even weaker than in the instrumented model and becomes non-significant.  

















Intercept              0.401 ***          6.627       9.703 ** 
(0.142) (4.245) (4.178)   
Knowledge Specificity            ‐0.003         0.432       0.683  
(0.028) (0.841) (0.802)   
Transaction Complexity             0.120 **         6.281 ***        5.950 *** 
(0.058) (1.736) (1.649)   
Transaction Uncertainty             0.524 ***         8.847 ***        5.715 * 
(0.102) (3.035) (3.097)   
Vendor Familiarity             0.064 ***        ‐0.892 *      ‐0.846 * 
(0.017) (0.491) (0.465)   




Adj. R2             0.715          0.098        0.190
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
 
The results in Table 7 address contract extensiveness at the function level. This more granular 
perspective, like the aggregate perspective, shows knowledge specificity not to have a statistically 
significant association with the expected contract functions, thus, leaving Hypothesis 1 unsupported. 
Hypothesis 2, in contrast, is strongly supported by the results, showing that transaction complexity is 
positively associated with safeguarding and coordination extensiveness and negatively associated with 
adaptability extensiveness. As predicted, these associations remain significant after the inclusion of the 
instrumented T&M-ratio (Model 2 – Functions). Table 7 shows that transaction uncertainty is positively 
associated with coordination and adaptability extensiveness, supporting Hypothesis 3a. However, the 
inclusion of T&M-ratio weakens these two associations to a point where both are no longer statistically 
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significant, supporting Hypothesis 3b. The results also support Hypothesis 4. Vendor familiarity is 
negatively associated with coordination and adaptability extensiveness. As predicted, these associations 
were maintained after the inclusion of T&M-ratio. Finally, substitution in contract design decisions is 
confirmed at the function level only for safeguarding and coordination, as their extensiveness is 
negatively associated with T&M-ratio. Again, in all these runs, inclusion of the Mills ratio following 
Heckman’s adjustment for endogeneity yielded similar results (not reported here), except for a slight 
difference. Transaction uncertainty had a marginally significant association with adaptability 
extensiveness (p<0.1), like in the non-instrumented model. We conducted additional robustness testing 
due to the possibility of estimation bias arising from a single (dominant) vendor being the counter party to 
a disproportionate share of the contracts in our sample. We repeated the analysis after excluding contracts 
signed by the bank with this vendor. The results we obtained (not reported here) are qualitatively similar 
to those reported in Table 7, with only two relationships becoming non-significant for the smaller sample 
of contracts – the one between transaction uncertainty and adaptability extensiveness and the one between 
vendor familiarity and coordination extensiveness.8 


































Intercept          2.122  ***      1.356 *    0.711 ***       2.300 ***    3.298  ***      0.831 ***
    (0.256)     (0.778) (0.139) (0.249) (0.654)     (0.140)
Knowledge Specificity           0.055        ‐0.065        0.096    0.049       
(0.117)     (0.159) (0.109) (0.126)    
Transaction Complexity          1.085  ***      0.810 **   ‐0.124 **        1.042 ***    0.646  **     ‐0.135 **
(0.281)     (0.327) (0.059) (0.268) (0.259)     (0.059)
Transaction Uncertainty           1.858 ***    0.247 **    0.228         0.136
      (0.554) (0.097) (0.484)     (0.102)
Vendor Familiarity          ‐0.146 *   ‐0.100 ***   ‐0.180  **     ‐0.106 ***
     (0.087) (0.016) (0.073)     (0.015)
T&M‐ratio                  ‐0.518 **   ‐1.690  ***     ‐0.006
      (0.233) (0.217)     (0.058)
Adj. R2      0.093         0.085    0.144         0.152    0.412         0.144
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
                                                     
8 We also repeated the analysis with the entire sample, while accounting for a potential bias in the vendor familiarity variable by 
means of including two additional terms in all models: a dummy variable denoting every contract with the dominant vendor and 
an interaction of this dummy variable with vendor familiarity. The results we received were similar to those obtained upon 
exclusion of contracts from the dominant vendor. 
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A closer examination of the differences between Tables 6 and 7 provides insight into the value of looking 
beyond aggregate contract extensiveness. First, the results demonstrate that offsetting effects at the 
function level may not be visible at the aggregate level. Such is the case for the negative association 
between transaction complexity and the adaptability extensiveness, which is masked by a positive 
association at the aggregate level. Second, the results for aggregate extensiveness may mask the 
mitigating effects of T&M-ratio. In the case of transaction uncertainty, the inclusion of T&M-ratio 
diminishes the associations at the function level, an effect that is less evident at the aggregate level. 
DISCUSSION 
In this final section, we discuss our main findings in light of the theoretical gaps addressed in our study, 
in addition to topics for future research.   
Main Findings and Theoretical Gaps Addressed 
This paper has focused on two related theoretical gaps in the ITO contracting literature. The first gap was 
that this literature is more salient about considerations of ex-post hazard costs than about those of ex-ante 
contracting costs. Anderson and Dekker (2005) considered ex-ante contracting costs, but as a dependent 
variable driven by contract extensiveness rather than the other way around. Additionally, past research 
has focused on either contract type or contract extensiveness. It has overlooked the impact of contract 
type on ex-ante contracting costs and, thus, on contract extensiveness. Indeed, Anderson and Dekker 
(2005) did not observe contract type, and Chen and Bharadwaj (2009) used it to conduct a split-sample 
analysis. The second gap is that studies have focused on the aggregate extensiveness of a contract rather 
than on the extensiveness of specific contract functions. Anderson and Dekker (2005) and Chen and 
Bharadwaj (2009) are exceptions, but their taxonomies of contract functions were derived from their 
collected data rather than from theory.  
Our study has addressed these theoretical gaps by investigating the nuanced interplay between transaction 
costs and the two choices of contract type and contract extensiveness, while recognizing that these 
contract choices complement and substitute for each other. To facilitate our analysis, we relied on 
Eckhard and Mellewigt’s (2006) theory-based typology of contract functions (safeguarding, coordination, 
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and adaptability), and used the ex-ante and ex-post costs implied by different transaction and relational 
attributes as the theoretical vehicle for examining the interrelationship between the contract type and the 
extensiveness of these contract functions. The empirical analysis results generally support our research 
model, showing that contract type and contract extensiveness are alternative mechanisms for economizing 
on the transaction costs arising under different circumstances. An unexpected result, however, is that 
knowledge specificity was not associated with contract extensiveness or contract type. One plausible 
explanation is that, compared to other transaction and relational attributes, knowledge specificity has less 
bearing on contract design choices in the specific contexts of SDO and ITO. This view is well-supported 
by a comprehensive survey of empirical ITO research based on TCE: of 33 studies, only one-third find 
support for TCE’s prediction about asset specificity (Lacity et al. 2011). A finding similar to ours has also 
been reported by Aubert et al. (2012): 
Asset specificity has no significant effect on the extent of outsourcing. … Studies finding support 
for asset specificity were mostly looking at traditional industries. Maybe the effect of asset 
specificity can only be observed for extreme cases, where the investments are very large and 
durable. In IT services, such effect could not be found (p. 240). 
Other plausible explanations for the knowledge specificity result are rooted in methodology. Our use of 
contracts from a single client – a large international bank – may have resulted in relatively lower variance 
in knowledge specificity than in the other transaction attributes we studied. Alternatively, our measure of 
knowledge specificity may be too focused on business-related aspects. Tiwana and Keil (2004) linked 
knowledge specificity to the integration of client business knowledge and vendor technical knowledge.  In 
our specific context of a Tier One bank, where core banking and trade systems typically involve internally 
developed propriety software, technical knowledge specificity is also important but insufficiently 
reflected in the data and in our measure.  
Contributions and Implications 
Our study’s contribution to the IT literature is three-fold. The first is our explicit account of how ex-ante 
and ex-post transaction costs come into play in formulating hypotheses about contract design choices. We 
did so in the software development context, which differs from the broader ITO context in terms of the 
influence of ex-ante transaction costs on contract design. Ex-ante transaction costs are considerable in 
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SDO contracting. The intangibility of software and non-recurrent nature of development projects require 
extensive knowledge transfer and product specification before the contracting parties can agree on a 
predefined price. The research implication is that overemphasis on ex-post hazard costs cannot tell the 
whole story of how contract design choices come about. 
A second contribution is our fine-grained conceptualization of how the extensiveness of different contract 
functions varies with transaction and relational attributes, their implied transaction costs, and the contract 
type choice. Being at the intersection of the two understudied themes on which this paper is focused, this 
contribution is based on using a nuanced and explicit account of tradeoffs between ex-ante and ex-post 
transaction costs to explain variations in the extensiveness of different contract functions. In addition, our 
research model provides the basis for theorizing and demonstrating that studying aggregate contract 
extensiveness alone might conceal granular variations and even opposing influences on the extensiveness 
of specific contract functions. For example, although transaction complexity has an overall positive 
impact on aggregate contract extensiveness, it has a negative influence on adaptability extensiveness and 
this influence is not suppressed by the use of T&M contracts.  
Our third research contribution is the inclusion of contract type as a design choice that complements and 
substitutes for contract extensiveness, that is, a design choice that influences contract extensiveness while 
also being influenced by the same transaction and relational attributes influencing contract extensiveness. 
Our hypotheses suggest, and our findings confirm, that choosing a T&M contract in situations of high ex-
ante contracting costs makes it inefficient to develop extensive contracts. This is most apparent from the 
unique impact that transaction uncertainty has on contract design choices. Specifically, we find that 
contract extensiveness and contract type fully substitute for each other in controlling the extra transaction 
costs arising due to uncertainty. In other words, to control the higher ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs 
associated with higher transaction uncertainty, it is sufficient to either use a T&M contract or to expand 
the coordination and adaptability functions. Theoretically, this finding provides a plausible explanation 
for reports about the limited, or lack of, impact of transaction uncertainty on contract extensiveness 
(Anderson and Dekker 2005; Dibbern et al. 2004; Rindfleisch and Heide 1997).  
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Two broad practical implications emerge from our findings. The first concerns how contract design 
choices are related to each other, namely, the inclusion of specific clauses and provisions in SDO 
contracts cannot be independent of contract type. Managers should carefully decide on whether to use an 
FP contract or a T&M contract given the degree of transaction complexity and uncertainty, and the 
associated ex-ante contracting costs. Managers should then factor this choice into decisions on whether or 
not to include specific contractual provisions. In particular, when ex-ante contracting costs are expected to 
be high, a strategy of economizing on these costs is to postpone product specification and project 
coordination decisions to the software development stage, implying the practice of T&M contracts and 
low contract extensiveness. 
Another practical implication concerns contract functions. To begin with, advice to extend contract 
extensiveness must also identify the specific contract functions that need to be extensive. As an example, 
one of the contracts we studied was for a system that implements a well-established protocol for 
transferring different currencies between accounts. The project included interfaces to many internal 
systems. It was necessary to learn each interface and the relevant internal system, implement the protocol, 
and then test the interface under a variety of conditions. While this complex, multi-interface project 
required increased contractual coordination with the vendor during software development, less contractual 
adaptability was needed because the protocol itself and most internal systems were stable. In this sense, 
our findings highlight factors that guide managers’ decisions on the extensiveness of specific contract 
functions. For complex projects, our results direct practitioners to increase contractual safeguarding and 
coordination. For familiar vendors, contractual coordination can be less extensive even for complex 
systems. The obvious flipside is that extensive contractual adaptability is wasteful for complex projects 
and with familiar vendors. Overall, our results should motivate managers to discuss and assess relatively 
subtle attributes of the SDO project and the relationship in negotiating and contracting with their vendors, 
rather than use simple measures such as the cost or duration of a project to guide decisions on contract 
extensiveness (Lichtenstein 2004).  
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Limitations and Future Research 
All of this said, we recognize several limitations of this study. First, we have not examined the 
implications of contract design choices on the outcomes of SDO projects. This limitation cuts across most 
ITO contracting studies (Narayanaswamy et al. 2007). Future research ought to also focus on outcome, 
considering evidence that contractual controls, among other forms of formal controls, could impact the 
quality and efficiency of the outcome (Gopal and Gosain 2010). Second, our data on actual SDO contracts 
come from a single client organization that is large in size and has lengthy experience with SDO. While 
this methodological feature controls for the potential effects of client-related variables, our empirical 
results are likely to be influenced by idiosyncratic contracting practices that could limit their 
generalizability. Third, our analysis does not fully explore the vendor perspective. This perspective is not 
reflected in the data made available to us. Since vendors are typically involved in making contract design 
choices, future research could also take into account the contractual preferences of vendors. Fourth, the 
data coding was done by a research assistant who was granted physical access to SDO contracts on the 
bank’s premises. This person had more than a decade of IT industry experience, including project 
management experience in both client and vendor firms. Although data coding required no judgment or 
subjective interpretation, carrying out this effort by independent observers would have enabled testing for 
inter-rater reliability and eliminated a potential source of bias. Fifth, vendor familiarity is computed as a 
weighted combination of four measures, two indicating the number and total cost of past contracts with a 
vendor up to the observed contract, and two indicating the number and total cost of all contracts signed 
with a vendor in the sampling period. We use the two latter measures to proxy for expectations of 
continuity and future transactions with the vendor as the basis for developing inter-organizational trust. 
Such expectations have typically been measured by questionnaire items (Poppo et al. 2008), whereas we 
assumed that such expectations were reflected in the archival data available to us by the volume of 
transactions between client and vendor over the sampling period. Even so, it is possible that the forward-
looking expectations of the parties were different from the actual number and cost of contracts and that 
this biased our vendor familiarity values for vendors with a relatively large number of contracts.   
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Lastly, using a transaction, or a single contract, as the unit of analysis overlooks the possibility that SDO 
contracts may be interrelated. A single contract is the typical unit of analysis in TCE research. It also 
reflects well the practice at the bank of negotiating each contract separately. In particular, the bank has a 
different contracting procedure and a separate contract database for maintenance work, enabling our 
empirical analysis to focus on software development. This notwithstanding, development contracts may 
still relate to one another: specific contracts may build upon knowledge and specifications acquired on 
previous contracts, as in the case of a contract for a new version of an existing system. Dependencies 
among contracts could influence ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs, consequently affecting contract 
design choices. Given that we could not address these dependencies with our data (i.e., the bank’s 
database of development contracts includes no explicit links among contracts), we highlight this issue as 
an interesting extension for future research.   
Our study pinpoints two additional opportunities to build and improve on our analysis. An important 
venue is to more carefully study the interrelationships between contract design choices as a formal 
mediation model, using richer (temporally-oriented) data. In our results, a dominant impact of contract 
type on contract extensiveness appeared for higher transaction uncertainty. However, contract type did 
not diminish the need to adjust contract extensiveness for higher knowledge specificity, transaction 
complexity, or vendor familiarity. In this light, using path analysis terminology, we could say that 
contract type fully mediates (suppresses) the association of transaction uncertainty with contract 
extensiveness, while it partially mediates this association for other transaction and relational attributes. 
Such process models should be confirmed using richer data that track SDO decision making over time. 
Another direction for future research is to study complementary and substitution affects among contract 
functions. Argyres et al. (2007) were first to investigate this question, postulating that: “Contingency 
planning [adaptability] and task description [a facet of coordination] have reciprocal positive effects on 
one another, suggesting that they act as complements in complex, high-technology contracts” (p. 7). Their 
economic logic is that “opportunities for clearer and more detailed task description are often important 
by-products of the contingency planning activity, while opportunities for additional contingency planning 
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are important by-products of efforts at task description” (p. 7). In a similar vein, some of our theorizing 
draws on literature suggesting that increased coordination can reduce the need for certain safeguards, as 
coordination requires the client to engage the vendor more closely, and this can foster trust (Gefen et al. 
2008; Ouchi 1980). In sum, one can think of this direction as another column in Table 1 that contracting 
research could study, the same way one could add to this table the outcome of a contractual outsourcing 
relationship (measured by product quality or by adherence to schedule and budget) as an important 
dimension that contracting research could address more thoroughly. 
In conclusion, we believe that this paper’s conceptualizations and empirical findings will stimulate 
researchers to expand and build on our line of reasoning. Beyond addressing some of the limitations of 
our study, future research ought to look to advance the study of how different contract design mechanisms 
influence one another (high-level perspective) and how different contract functions influence one another 
(low-level perspective). In so doing, the distinction between ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs 
provides an important lens through which to understand contract design decisions.   
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